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For many American households, generosity is a core value. In 2017, Americans donated 
over $400 billion (Giving USA, 2018). This amount exceeded two percent of GDP, of which 70 
percent came from households. Alexis de Tocqueville was among the first to document the 
unique character of private action for the public good in the United States. Although giving and 
volunteering vary across U.S. cities and states (Hammack, 2000), charitable donations represent 
a growing and visible share of public good provision in the areas of education, health care, basic 
needs, arts and culture, and disaster relief services (NCCS, 1995).  
The Great Recession (December 2007 – June 2009) represented the most significant 
economic downturn in America since the Great Depression. From 2007 to 2009, real GDP fell by 
3.1 percentage points, real personal income per capita fell by 8.3 percentage points, and the 
unemployment rate increased from 4.6 percent to 9.3 percent (Moffitt, 2013). Based on 
aggregate data, during the Great Recession, Americans gave less, both in absolute and relative 
terms (Giving USA, 2018). While there is initial evidence that the 2008 economic downturn 
affected charitable behavior by U.S. households, less well understood is how the recession 
impacted giving across demographic groups. This paper expands the knowledge of how 
patterns of charitable giving vary across demographic categories and by level of education 
during periods of economic hardship and proposes solutions to mitigate future instabilities and 
rebuild the donor base that has fallen steadily since 2008.  
The empirical analysis in this paper draws on a unique longitudinal data source – the 
Philanthropy Panel Study (PPS), a module within the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID). The data allow us to examine the influence of economic and 
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demographic factors on generosity. The PPS is the only existing longitudinal dataset on 
philanthropy based on a nationally representative sample of U.S. households. To date, it is the 
critical resource that can illuminate how demographic shifts will influence generosity across 
generations now and in the future. The main findings in this paper reveal important shifts in 
charitable giving during the first 15 years of the 21st century. Taken together, the results 
indicate that the proportion of Americans who give has declined by 11 percent during this 
timeframe, the equivalent of approximately 20 million Americans who are no longer giving to 
charitable institutions. Similarly, private transfers have declined by comparable percentages 
from the pre- to post- recession timeframe. The decline in volunteering is relatively moderate, 
with a 3.5 percent decline during a similar period.  
 By examining both pre- and post- recession giving behaviors, we are able to 
disaggregate the impact of the recession on charitable giving by demographic cohort and 
income level and uncover how giving behavior has varied over time. The empirical findings 
suggest some challenges ahead for philanthropy. The ranks of Americans who do not contribute 
to charitable giving has grown over time. While older households (over age 60) have played an 
outsized role by increasing their giving rates and amounts donated to charitable causes, 
younger households’ giving rates have grown more slowly during the past decade. By examining 
donor behavior and characteristics, including race and ethnicity, age, gender, and education 
level, the paper provides new insights into how economic shocks can influence overall giving 
rates and dollar amounts by diverse demographic groups. 
The overall decrease in givers has implications for private charity’s ability to support the 
social sector and participation in civil society. The results in this paper highlight demographic 
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barriers to philanthropic participation and reveal that an increasing number of Americans have 
either fallen out of the habit of giving or failed to form this habit to begin with. It is essential to 
better understand the opportunities to strengthen overall charitable giving among American 
households. 
 
Charitable Giving Motives: Private versus Public Benefits to Donors 
 Researchers across various disciplines have examined what motivates individuals to give 
to charitable causes. Fields as diverse as political science, social psychology, sociology, and 
economics have focused on: (1) Which individuals, under what circumstances, engage in 
charitable behavior? and (2) When do individuals contribute, rather than free-ride on the 
contributions of others? Existing models provide insights into how aggregate shocks like the 
Great Recession influence donor behavior. Konrath and Handy (2018) provide a comprehensive 
review of the charitable giving literature, classifying previously discussed motivations into two 
broad categories,:, those that generate: 1) public (other-oriented or extrinsic) benefits, and 2) 
private (self-oriented or intrinsic) benefits. We draw on this theoretical model of private versus 
public benefit to the donor to discuss implications for charitable giving during a period of 
economic downturn, such as the recent Great Recession.  
The primary limitation of this approach is that individual motivations for giving do not 
always categorize discretely into one of these two binary options (public vs. private benefits) 
and donors may choose to give based upon overlapping motivations. In the public category, 
motivations include helping others (e.g., “pure altruism”; Becker, 1974). Private, self-oriented 
motivations include deriving “warm glow” benefits created by the act of giving (Andreoni, 
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1989), securing the approval of friends, family, or others within one’s social network (i.e., 
“social benefits”), and reducing guilt or negative emotions from not giving.  
 
The Impact of Public Benefits during a Recession 
Existing models have emphasized the importance of altruism for understanding why 
people engage in charitable donations. Becker (1974) posited that purely altruistic motivations 
help explain giving. Under pure altruism, individuals give of their private resources to improve 
the conditions of others without any expectation of deriving a personal benefit from making 
their gift. Economic theory provides mechanisms through which economic downturns may 
influence charitable behavior. During an economic downturn, potential donors are more likely 
to respond to higher levels of need by increasing their donations, holding all other factors 
constant. During a downturn, potential donors are also more likely to receive specific requests 
to give as well as detailed information about individuals who are experiencing greater than 
typical need. To improve the conditions of others, potential donors may be more likely to give 
during recessions to meet the higher levels of need in their communities. One additional factor 
that deserves close attention is that during periods of economic hardship, the government may 
also expand spending to address needs. Under pure altruism, donors are concerned primarily 
that charities receive some total amount of money, regardless of the sources (Hernandez-
Murillo & Roisman, 2005; see also, Becker, 1974; Roberts, 1987). For this reason, if potential 
donors were aware of higher spending from the government during the recession, they might 
decrease their charitable donations.  
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The Impact of Private Benefits during a Recession 
 An important question is how private benefits including the “warm glow” associated 
with giving may be altered during recessions. Andreoni (1989) provided a formal model of the 
private benefits that donors derive from their charitable giving: “First, people simply demand 
more of the public good…Second, people get some private goods benefit from their gift per se, 
like a warm glow” (Andreoni, 1989, pp. 1448-1449). Under “warm glow” motives, individuals 
are less concerned with the outcome of giving and more concerned with the benefit they derive 
as a result of making their gift. In contrast to pure altruism, where giving may decrease during 
an economic recession when the government steps in to meet need, donors motivated by a 
“warm glow” may continue giving at the same pre-recession level to experience the positive 
benefits or “warm glow” benefits and self-esteem they obtain from giving. 
In recent studies, scholars have emphasized the role that social norms have in 
influencing charitable behavior. Within charitable giving, networks are formed that impact the 
willingness to contribute to charitable organizations and solicitations for contributions. When 
philanthropic behavior is publicly observable people give more (Hoffman et al., 1996; Reinstein 
and Riener, 2012; Soetevent, 2005). Indeed experiments show that observing prosocial 
behavior leads people to adopt a norm prescribing prosocial behavior and to increase their 
prosocial behavior the more others are observed behaving consistently with that norm (Krupka 
and Weber, 2009). There is growing interest in understanding the role that social norms play in 
charitable giving (Andreoni, 1990; Vesterlund, 2006).  
However, the relationship between private benefits and social norms associated with 
charitable behavior may change during economic downturns, as social norms or societal 
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expectations around charitable behavior shift because potential donors are themselves 
experiencing greater need. Individuals may turn to their reference group peers or social 
network to determine if and how they should give. If their reference group continues to view 
giving in a positive way and gives frequently, then the social norm of giving provides motivation 
for a perspective donor to give also, regardless of economic circumstances (Croson, Handy, & 
Shang, 2009). However, donors may derive reduced private benefits from giving or experience 
less guilt from not contributing to charitable causes when times are hard. During recessions and 
other adverse economic shocks, donors may also receive fewer requests from their social 
networks to contribute, since they face limited discretionary resources and may need to sustain 
their own household needs during periods of hardship.  
Finally, a range of additional social influences that motivate donors to give may be less 
salient during an economic downturn. For example, if donors give primarily to avoid guilt, these 
donors may feel less morally obliged to help others in need because of shifts in their personal 
circumstances (see Table A1.1: Theories, Benefits, and Recession Expectations in the Appendix 
for a summary of expectations regarding the roles of public and private benefits during 
recessions). 
 
How Donor Characteristics Influence Charitable Giving During a Recession 
Although a large body of research investigates the motives for charitable giving, 
including the role of demographic variables in explaining patterns of charitable giving, less is 
known about how such donor characteristics interact with economic conditions to impact 
charitable giving during economic downturns such as the Great Recession of 2007-2009. During 
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the Great Recession, the U.S. unemployment rate increased. The national rate doubled from 5.0 
percent of the labor force in December 2007 to a high of 10.0 percent in October 2009. The 
percent of unemployed, under-employed, and discouraged workers grew from 8.8 percent in 
December 2007 to 17.2 percent in October 2009 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). Even if the 
Great Recession did not directly impact one’s income during this specific time frame, 
experiencing such an economic crisis could lead people to give less than they otherwise would 
have given because they anticipate worse conditions to come and potential hardship resulting 
from the recession in the future. As Meer, Miller, & Wulfsberg (2016, 3) summarize, “the 
effects on charitable giving are of particular interest because the need for private philanthropy 
is generally greatest during times of economic distress, just when the ability of donors to 
contribute is most limited.” 
Previous research has shown that periods of recession and economic hardship may have 
differential impacts by age, gender, and race. Elsby, Hibijn, and Sahin (2010) found that 
younger, male, less educated workers and ethnic minorities have been hit harder than other 
demographic groups during difficult economic times. These cohorts have experienced steeper 
rises in unemployment and their overall experiences throughout the period have been more 
responsive to cyclical conditions compared to other demographic groups. Another important 
concern is how a recession may affect donors at different life stages because of the potential 
for habit formation to influence charitable behavior, whether in moderating the effects of the 
economic downturn or exacerbating it in the long run (Meer, 2013). 
Several researchers have examined the impact of the recession by gender and race. 
Economists and the media have frequently characterized the 2008 recession as a “man-cession” 
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(Wall, 2009) explaining that, while it has been difficult for most Americans, the recent recession 
era negatively affected men more than it did women. According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2012), 78 percent of jobs lost during the recession were held by men. The 
unemployment rate of men peaked in October 2009 at 11.2 percent, compared to the 
unemployment rate for women at 8.7 percent. Additionally, the unemployment rate in 
predominantly male sectors, such as manufacturing, rose more than predominantly female 
sectors, such as education (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). Similarly, “the unemployment 
rates of blacks exceeded those of whites in urban areas of both North and South” throughout 
the Great Depression (Sundstrom, 1992). 
Considering the effects of the Great Recession of 2008 on unemployment combined 
with the range of public- and private-benefit based motivations for charitable giving discussed 
above, we anticipate that many Americans may have altered the frequency and amount of their 
charitable giving as a result of the recent economic downturn. Since we find some testable 
implications, we offer the following hypotheses: 
H1: Post-recession giving rates and amounts for all Americans will be significantly 
different than their pre-recession giving rates and amounts. 
Moreover, we would expect that demographic groups more affected by an economic 
downturn of the magnitude of the Great Recession (the young, male workers, ethnic minorities, 
and the less educated) will likely make substantial negative changes to the frequency and 
amount of their giving.  
H2: Post-recession giving rates and amounts by younger Americans will be significantly 
lower than their pre-recession giving rates and amounts. 
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H3: Post-recession giving rates and amounts by men will be significantly lower than their 
pre-recession giving rates and amounts. 
H4: Post-recession giving rates and amounts by racial and ethnic minorities will be 
significantly lower than their pre-recession giving rates and amounts. 
H5: Post-recession giving rates and amounts by individuals with lower levels of 
education will be significantly lower than their pre-recession giving rates and amounts. 
 
Data and Methods 
The underlying data for this paper are drawn from the Philanthropy Panel Study (PPS), 
the generosity module of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is the longest 
running longitudinal household survey in the world. The study began in 1968 with a nationally 
representative sample of over 18,000 individuals living in 5,000 families in the United States. 
The PSID tracks the same families’ charitable giving biennially. In order to keep the PSID 
representative of the U.S. population, a refresher sample of post-1968 immigrant families was 
introduced in 1997. The PSID is based at the Institute of Survey Research at the University of 
Michigan and the data are publicly available to researchers and analysts.  
The PPS module was added in the year 2000 and, to date, includes eight waves of data 
measuring giving in the previous calendar years (2000-2014). The PPS philanthropy module 
used in this study is unique because it provides high-quality data on charitable giving 
comparable to the U.S. Individual Taxpayer Return data1F2 (Wilhelm, 2006). In addition, the PSID 
                                                     
2 The PSID philanthropy module is the only data set on giving comparable to the IRS taxpayer data in coverage. 
However, we should note that the IRS taxpayer database provides a more accurate picture of charitable giving at 
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also contains high quality data on income and wealth, which are typically unavailable within 
existing data sets on philanthropic behavior, allowing us to more fully control for the 
household’s economic resources.  
In the PPS, giving to charitable and nonprofit organizations is measured in gifts of 
money, assets, and property/goods to organizations with disparate goals and purposes. These 
include giving to religious congregations (e.g., churches, synagogues, mosques) and other 
organizations (e.g., TV and radio ministries) whose primary purpose is religious activity or 
spiritual development. The secular category encompasses helping people in need, providing 
health care or conducting medical research (e.g., hospitals, cancer charities, telethons), 
delivering education (e.g., schools, universities, PTAs, libraries), providing youth and family 
services (e.g., boys’ and girls’ clubs, Big Brothers or Sisters, sports leagues), promoting the arts 
and culture (e.g., museums, theatre, public broadcasting), improving neighborhoods and 
communities (e.g., community associations, service clubs), preserving the environment or 
advancing sustainability, providing international aid (e.g., international children’s funds, 
disaster relief, human rights), and engaging in civic or social advocacy. Throughout this paper, 
the term “combined purpose” giving refers to organizations like the United Way and other 
public-society benefit groups that collect donations for reallocation to a variety of causes. 
Giving to all of these purposes, except religious activity or spiritual development, is referred to 
as giving to “charitable organizations” or secular giving. 
                                                     
and above the 90th percentile of charitable giving. The IRS tax data is less suitable for this study because immigrant 
status and experience is not recorded, and immigrants may be less likely to itemize their deductions.  
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The PPS definition of charitable giving includes any gifts of money, assets, or property or 
goods made directly to the organization, through payroll deduction, or collected by other 
means on behalf of the charity. It does not include political contributions. The PPS 
questionnaire uses a threshold amount of $25, meaning respondents must have given at least 
$25 to charity in order to be asked subsequent detailed questions about their giving. 
The sample for the present study consists of individuals who were heads of households 
or partners of heads of households in at least one wave of the sample. We used all three sub-
samples within the PSID: the nationally-representative sub-sample, the low-income over-
sample, and the 1997 immigrant refresher sample. Previous studies show that the PSID sample 
remains nationally-representative despite attrition (Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, & Moffitt, 1998; 
Schoeni et al., 2013). Our results use the PSID’s weights. The data has been pooled from the 
2001-2015 individual level PPS samples. After dropping obvious outliers and observations with 
missing values, the sample size for this study is 100,501 responses, representing 20,217 unique 
individuals.  
Our baseline regression model can be expressed as 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=𝛽𝛽0+𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖+𝜸𝜸𝜸𝜸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝜽𝜽𝜽𝜽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+δ𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1). 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents outcome variables for respondent i, living in household j, at time t. 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is 
the dummy variable indicating the time after the Great Recession. 𝜸𝜸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes an individual’s 
socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, employment status, marital status, 
education, race, and religion at time t. 𝜽𝜽jt includes household socio-economic variables, such as 
the natural logarithm of household permanent income, the number of children in the 
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household, and the natural logarithm of wealth. State fixed effects are also included in our 
model. 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the random error term. 
 Our baseline models use Pooled Ordinary Least Square for log giving amounts and 
Pooled Probit for giving incidence. Marginal effects are reported using Probit models2F3. An 
important advantage of pooling together the PPS data from eight waves is that doing so 
increases the precision of the estimation, meaning that the standard errors are narrower. 
However, pooling the data introduces complications such that the same individuals appear 
multiple times in the pooled data. This is handled by “clustering” the standard errors at the 
individual level. 
All giving amounts are adjusted to 2016 U.S. dollars, unless otherwise noted.  
 
Results 
I. Descriptive Statistics  
We first discuss household characteristics that may influence charitable behavior both 
before and after the recession. Table A1.2 provides summary statistics on charitable giving 
variables, as well as a rich set of demographic factors and income and wealth measures, which 
we exploit to fully capture changes in the household’s economic position before the Great 
Recession. As permanent income tends to have a larger effect on charitable behavior than 
                                                     
3 The control variables in our analysis are listed in Appendix table A1.2: Summary statistics, Panel 2. Socio-
demographic variables. For dichotomous variables, the results represent the change in the probability and the 
level of contributions associated with a change in the indicator variable from zero to one. 
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transitory income sources (Auten, Holger-Sieg, and Clotfelter, 2002), we use a measure of the 
household’s permanent income.  
Our measure of permanent income is based on average family income from the past 
three available waves of the PSID.3F4 We note that there are important differences in permanent 
income and wealth before and after the Great Recession. Mean permanent household income 
is lower after the Great Recession compared to before the Great Recession ($77,957 versus 
$84,053, respectively). Following the Great Recession, we also note that employment rates are 
lower, suggesting a longer-term impact of the downturn. Prior to the recession, 67 percent of 
heads of households were employed, compared to 62 percent following the recession.  
II. Baseline Regression Model 
Table A1.3 presents regression results on the incidence of charitable giving and amounts 
contributed to charitable causes. Our main dependent variables are: (i) whether an individual 
contributed to any charitable organization during the year and whether they contributed to 
religious causes or secular charities, and (ii) the log total amount contributed in the survey 
period, as well as the log total amounts contributed to religious and secular charities. All 
estimates shown in Table A1.3 include controls for socio-demographic variables, log permanent 
income, and log wealth.  
 Table A1.4 shows the regression adjusted predicted probabilities and amounts for all 
Americans before and after the Great Recession. The predictions are calculated by first 
obtaining the predicted values of all samples based on regression coefficients and each 
                                                     
4 Total family income can contain negative values. The number of households with negative numbers for those 
variables is relatively small (< 0.1%), and we replace these negative values with missing values. 
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individual’s original characteristics and then taking the average4F5. For example, the table shows 
that non-white Americans gave $1,670 before recession and $1,476 after recession. White 
Americans gave $1,716 before recession and $1,532 after recession. These four predictions are 
calculated via the following steps: 
1. Estimate the regression using the full sample interacting the race dummy variable (1 if 
non-white) and recession dummy variable; 
2. Hold everyone at their original characteristics controlled in the regression except for the 
race and recession dummy variables. Set race dummy variable to 1 (non-white) and 
recession variable to 0 (before recession) for everyone in the estimated sample and obtain 
a predicted giving amount for each observation. The mean of these predicted amounts is 
$1,670. 
3. Our other three predictions are similarly calculated.  
Reviewing Table A1.4, Columns 1-3, we examine the incidence of charitable giving. We 
note that the indicator variable post-recession period, after we have introduced controls for 
socio-demographic variables, has a significant negative impact on the probability of overall 
charitable contributions. Holding other factors constant, households are 6.4 percent less likely 
to give to charity after the recession. Similarly, the likelihood of giving to secular and religious 
purposes declined 5.1 percent and 7.9 percent respectively after the recession. In addition, in 
the specification in Columns 4-6 of the same table, when we examine the average amount 
contributed, we find that the recession has a significant negative effect on the levels of 
charitable giving too. Overall giving amounts declined $186 after the recession, holding other 
                                                     
5 The predictions in our analysis are obtained from available commands in statistical package rather than manually. 
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factors constant. Interestingly, most of the decline in overall giving amounts is driven by the 
decline in giving to religious purposes—we see a $162 decline in religious giving after the 
recession, compared with a statistically insignificant $24 decline in giving to secular purposes 
after the recession.5F6 Appendix table A1.5 provides raw coefficients for all regressions in Table 
A1.4. 
III.  Hypothesis testing 
An important finding within the literature on charitable giving is that demographic 
factors, such as age, gender, marital status, race and ethnicity, and economic factors all 
influence charitable giving. In this study, we focus on changes in giving over time rather than 
results based on one point in time. A key strength of panel data is the ability to better 
understand how changes in household demographic characteristics, among other factors, 
induce changes in the practice of giving. Consistent with existing studies, we find that age, 
educational attainment, household permanent income, and wealth are positively associated 
with both the incidence and level of charitable giving.6F7  
 
Hypothesis 1: Post-recession giving rates and amounts for all Americans will be significantly 
different from their pre-recession giving rates and amounts. 
                                                     
6 We also examine giving amounts using Tobit specifications. The differences in unconditional expected values are 
$300 for overall giving, $90 for secular giving (insignificant), and $275 for religious giving. While the estimated 
declines are larger using Tobit specification, as expected, it is still true that the decline in overall giving is mainly 
due to the decline in giving to religious purposes.  
7 Married households are more likely to give and have higher levels of giving compared to co-habiting households 
(the omitted category), holding all other factors constant. Similarly, gender has a positive impact on giving –and 
single women are more likely to give compared to single men, holding other variables constant. Interestingly, the 
effects of race on charitable giving are more complex. 
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Considering Table A1.4, the overall incidence of charitable giving by all Americans 
declined following the recession. In Table A1.4, Panel A, we show that the predicted giving rate 
was 66.6 percent before the recession began and 60.2 percent after the recession ended. This 
6.4 percentage point change in giving rates is statistically significant. Looking to the same table, 
we see that giving to secular purposes declined at a similar rate from 56.2 percent before the 
recession to 51.1 percent after the recession, a 5.1 percentage point, or 10 percent decrease. 
Considering Figure 3, giving to religious purposes, however, has experienced a much larger 
decrease, 21 percent or 8 percentage points, from 45.4 percent before the recession to 37.5 
percent after the recession. We note that the decline in giving to religious purposes is larger 
than the decline in giving to secular purposes and statistically significant (see Table A1.4, Panel 
A). 
The overall average predicted giving level by all Americans dropped from $1,704 prior to 
the recession to $1,518 after the recession, an 11 percent decline (see Table A1.4). When we 
examine giving levels by sub-category, we find that the religious giving amount declined by 16 
percent, from $1,040 before the recession to $878 after the recession (see Table A1.4). The 
predicted secular giving amount remained at the same level after the recession (see Table 
A1.4). 
To summarize, overall giving by Americans was significantly lower – both in terms of the 
rate of giving and the amounts donated – after the Great Recession compared to before the 
recession began. The secular and religious giving rates and amounts also declined between the 
pre- and post- recession eras, though giving to religion declined faster in both rate and level. 
These results support Hypothesis 1 and provide directionality for the hypothesis. Taken 
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together, the Great Recession appears to have decreased charitable giving by American 
households. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Post-recession giving rates and amounts by younger Americans will be 
significantly lower than their pre-recession giving rates and amounts. 
Both before and after the Great Recession, the overall giving rate of older Americans 
(defined as over 35 years of age) was higher than the overall giving rate of younger Americans 
(defined as less than or equal to 35 years of age). Yet, the giving rates of both groups declined 
between the beginning and end of the Great Recession.  
{Insert Figure 1 about here} 
From Table A1.4, Panel B we see that, for younger Americans, the predicted giving rates 
declined from 58.8 percent before the recession to 52.2 percent after the recession, a 6.6 
percentage point difference. This represents a statistically significant decline. For older 
Americans, their predicted giving rate also declined from 69.1 percent before the recession to 
63.5 percent after the recession, a 5.6 percentage point decrease. While both groups saw 
declines in their giving incidence, the predicted giving rate decline for younger households was 
larger than that of older Americans. Similar results were found for overall giving amounts.  
Interestingly, when reviewing giving to secular and religious purposes separately, we 
found that the declines in both the secular giving rate and secular giving amount were more 
substantial than among older Americans. Younger Americans’ likelihood of giving to secular 
purposes was down 13% after the recession, almost two times the decline for older Americans 
during the same time-frame. Predicted giving amounts to secular causes declined by 18% for 
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young Americans, compared with no significant change for older Americans. Alternatively, in 
terms of religious giving, the decline in both giving rate and amount given was smaller for 
younger Americans compared to older Americans.  
{Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here} 
 From these results, we find partial support for Hypothesis 2. While the overall giving 
rate of younger Americans was lower after the Great Recession compared to before the 
Recession, the average overall giving amount by younger Americans did not decline. Moreover, 
we learn that the Great Recession also had an impact on older Americans, at least in terms of 
average overall giving amounts (see Figure 1 and Table A1.4, Panel B). When we review secular 
and religious giving separately, our results indicate that the recession had a larger impact on 
young Americans’ secular giving and older Americans’ religious giving (see Figures 2, 3, Table 
A1.4).  
We recognize the limitations of the broad age categories used in this initial analysis. To 
expand our investigation, we also examined age cohorts beyond the older American versus 
younger American comparison, by analyzing giving behaviors by different generations: 
Millennials, Gen X, Baby Boomer, the Silent Generation, and The Greatest Generation. From 
Figure A2.3 (in Appendix 2), which presents the predicted rates of giving by generation, we 
show that younger generational cohorts were less likely to give both before and after the 
recession.  
In addition, we found that the giving rates of Millennials and Baby Boomers were most 
affected by the Great Recession. These two generational cohorts (Millennials and Baby 
Boomers) were approximately four percentage points less likely to give after the recession, 
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compared with their own giving rate before the recession. The decline in giving by Baby 
Boomers may be attributed to life cycle changes with a sizable fraction of Boomers facing 
retirement and transitions from the workforce, and thus loss of a steady income, during the 
Recession era. 
We also analyzed giving amounts by generational cohorts (see Figure A2.4 in Appendix 
2). Reviewing predicted giving amounts, we see a decline for Millennials between the pre- and 
post- recession period. However, for the other cohorts analyzed, predicted giving levels held 
steady or increased slightly during the same time-frame. While the number of Millennials in our 
sample before the recession began was relatively small (N=2,5627F8), looking at post-recession 
numbers, we found that Millennials, particularly, do not appear to be giving at rates 
comparable to how previous generations gave when they were at the age and life stage of 
current Millennials. These results are consistent with existing analysis from Rooney et al. 
(2018). High unemployment rates as they were entering the workforce and slow wage growth 
for millennial households, resulting from the Great Recession, have likely affected Millennial 
giving rates and amounts. Whether Millennials will be able to “catch up” to their counterparts 
in other generations and develop a strong habit of giving has yet to be determined. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Post-recession giving rates and amounts by men will be significantly lower than 
their pre-recession giving rates and amounts. 
 Our baseline regression results show that married couples are more likely to give 
                                                     
8 This is in person-years, meaning that the same individual could be in multiple waves of the study. The number of 
unique individuals is N = about 1,500. 
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compared to single women, who themselves are more likely to give compared to single men, 
both before and after the Great Recession (see Figure 1 and Table A1.4, Panel C). We also note 
a decline in the predicted giving rates of single men, single women, and married couples 
between the pre- and post- recession periods. However, the recession had the largest effect on 
single men. We found that there was an 8.1 percentage point decline (from 58.9 percent before 
the recession to 50.1 percent after the recession) in predicted giving rates for single men, 
compared with a 5.1 percentage point decrease for single women, and a 6.5 percentage point 
decrease for married couples. 
When we review change in predicted giving amounts pre- and post- recession, we find 
that single men, single women and married couples experienced similar rates of decline in 
overall giving amounts during this timeframe. However, single men gave nearly 20% less to 
religion after the recession compared to before it began, the largest decline among the groups 
compared. These results support Hypothesis 3, that the post-recession giving rates and 
amounts by men, would be significantly lower than their pre-recession giving rates and 
amounts. It also suggests that periods of recession have a greater effect on the giving behaviors 
of single men compared to single women and/or married couples. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Post-recession giving rates and amounts by racial and ethnic minorities will be 
significantly lower than their pre-recession giving rates and amounts. 
 Ethnic and racial identity may exert a complex influence on philanthropic behavior. 
Looking at Figure 1 (see also Table A1.4, Panel D) we see that the predicted giving rate of white 
Americans was higher than the giving rate of non-white Americans both before and after the 
 22 
Great Recession (before recession: 68.0 percent compared 63.1 percent, respectively; after 
recession: 61.7 percent compared to 56.0 percent). In terms of change in giving during the 
recession era, non-white Americans had a slightly larger decline in their giving rate than white 
Americans: a 7.1 percentage point decline compared to a 6.3 percentage point decline, 
respectively. However, the difference in the decline is not statistically significant.  
In terms of predicted giving amounts, whites and non-whites gave, on average, similar 
amounts before and after the recession (before recession: $1,716 compared to $1,670; after 
recession: $1,532 compared to $1,476). Also, the average giving amounts of both groups 
declined by about the same magnitude during the recession era (see Figure 1 and Table A1.4, 
Panel D). While these results support Hypothesis 4, which posited that the post-recession giving 
rates and amounts by racial and ethnic minorities would be significantly lower than their pre-
recession giving rates and amounts, they also shed light on the bigger picture. While previous 
work has found that periods of economic downturn can have a stronger negative effect on non-
whites compared to whites, our results suggest that, at least in terms of their charitable giving 
rates, the Great Recession had a similar negative effect on all races (see Table A1.4, Panel D). 
 
Hypothesis 5: Post-recession giving rates and amounts, by individuals with lower levels of 
education, will be significantly lower than their pre-recession giving rates and amounts. 
 Reviewing Figure 1 (see also Table A1.4, Panel E), we examine predicted giving rates by 
education level, and we observe a general decline across various educational categories in 
terms of giving rates before and after the recession. However, the decline in the rate of giving 
during the recession era is smaller for individuals with higher levels of educational attainment. 
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Specifically, there is a 6.7 percentage point decline in predicted giving rates for those heads of 
households who had a high school degree or less, compared with a 5.0 percentage point 
decline in giving rates for those heads of households with more than a high school degree (see 
Table A1.4, Panel E). When we turn to examine average giving amounts by education levels, a 
more complex story emerges. While individuals with more than a high school degree give larger 
average amounts both before and after the recession, their decline in average giving amount 
during the recession era is also more substantial, with about a 12 percent decrease, from 
$2,141 to $1,891. The average giving amount by individuals with less education did not decline 
by the same magnitude. Interestingly, the Great Recession appears to have had a stronger 
negative effect on the average giving amounts of individuals with higher levels of education. 
From these results, we find partial support for Hypothesis 5. While the overall giving rate for 
individuals with lower educational attainment was lower after the Great Recession compared 




The Great Recession represented the largest economic downturn in America since the 
Great Depression of 1929. During the Great Recession, Americans gave less, both in absolute 
and relative terms, and different segments of the American population significantly altered 
their giving patterns. Although several theoretical approaches may suggest a positive impact on 
charitable giving during periods of economic downturns, our results show more complex 
patterns by demographic groups. Overall, the findings generally showed a negative effect of the 
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Great Recession on charitable giving rates and average giving amounts. As such, theories of 
pure altruism, shifts in social norms, reduced social pressure, guilt, and the potential for 
receiving fewer requests to give from one’s social networks provide relevant explanations for 
charitable giving behaviors during periods of economic downturn (see Table A1.1). 
We find that rates of overall, secular, and religious giving declined for all Americans 
between the pre- and post- recession time periods. Similarly, average giving amounts declined 
during the same era for many Americans. Within certain demographic segments, we found 
differences in the magnitude of the negative effect of the Great Recession. For example, when 
we compared across demographic categories, important differences emerged. In particular, age 
exerted an important influence on giving both before and after the recession. Younger 
Americans were less likely to give after the recession compared to before the recession. 
However, among younger Americans who gave after the recession, their average giving amount 
remained consistent with pre-recession average giving amounts. Interestingly, we also 
observed some shifts in giving patterns for some groups of older Americans, in particular, 
Boomers saw their predicted giving rates decline between the pre- and post- recession era and 
the average giving amounts by the Greatest Generation also declined during this same time-
frame. 
In terms of gender, previous research has shown that periods of economic downturn 
can have a greater effect on men compared to women. Our results supported this hypothesis as 
we found that the rate and average amount of giving by single men declined more rapidly 
between the pre- and post- recession time period compared to the rate and average amount of 
giving by single women. While previous research may suggest that non-whites are more 
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negatively impacted by recessions than whites, our results showed that all races experienced a 
similar decline in giving rates and average giving amounts during the Great Recession. Our 
results regarding the role of educational attainment and its influence on charitable giving 
during a recession yielded intriguing results. While individuals with higher levels of education 
are more likely to continue giving at the same rate during a recession, their average amount 
given decreases. On the other hand, while the likelihood of giving among individuals with lower 
levels of education decreases during a recession, among those individuals who continue giving, 
their average amount given holds relatively steady. 
 
Decomposition Analysis 
An important question that merits further consideration is the role of economic factors 
in explaining the observed shifts in giving. In general, a complex set of socioeconomic and 
demographic factors influences both the likelihood of giving and the levels of charitable giving. 
Importantly, household economic factors changed dramatically from the period before to after 
the recession. To better understand the role of economic factors, we conducted Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition analyses exploring the gap in both giving rates and amounts before and after 
the recession. The decomposition analysis controls for three economic factors: family income, 
family wealth (excluding home value), and home ownership.  
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition divides the giving rates in two groups – before and 
after the Great Recession – into a component that can be attributed to group differences in the 
three key economic variables and a residual component that cannot be accounted for by these 
factors alone. The changes in economic endowments also explained 49 percent of the decline in 
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total giving amounts after the recession. While several factors influence the choice to donate, 
some key indicators such as household composition, educational attainment, marriage, and 
religious affiliation and attendance are generally positively associated with an increased 
likelihood of donating to charity and the amounts donated. The change in giving that is not 
attributable to changes in economic circumstances may be explained by changes in religious 
affiliation, religious attendance, and other individual and household-level variables. 
In addition, we conducted a decomposition analysis for both older and younger 
Americans. We found that three household economic factors (i.e., income, wealth, and home 
ownership) explained the decline in giving incidence for both younger and older Americans.8F9 
However, for younger Americans, a larger share (51 percent) of the decline in their giving 
amounts can be attributed to these economic factors, whereas 45 percent of the decline in 
older Americans’ giving amounts are attributable to the same economic factors. When we 
analyze the background factors that explain the results by marital status and gender, we note 
that economic factors affected single men and single women differently during the recession. 
Results from the decomposition analysis showed that changes in income, wealth, and home 
ownership explained only one third of the decline in giving rates for single men and married 
couples but explained 58 percent of the decline in giving rates for single women. One plausible 
explanation for the changes that we observe is that households may have moved away from 
formal charitable giving to more informal types of charitable giving or private transfers.  
                                                     
9 We conducted the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with three independent variables: log real income, log real 
wealth, and home ownership. 45% of the difference in giving rates before and after the recession is due to 
endowments: the gap in giving rates after the recession would be 45% less if families had the same level of 
income, wealth, and home ownership as they did before the recession began.  
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Alternatives to Charitable Giving Levels & Amounts: Private Transfers & Volunteerism 
The PSID contains information on a rich set of indicators including private transfers and 
volunteering. A significant part of our working hypothesis was the potential that different 
behaviors that have formed in the last 15 years may be replacing traditional giving and are not 
being included in the current measures. To investigate this further, we reviewed a host of 
behaviors ranging from volunteering to private transfers. 
Similar to formal charitable giving, which declined for all Americans during the Great 
Recession, private transfers also declined during this same timeframe. Reviewing Table A1.6, 
we see that the predicted incidence and levels of private transfers provided to non-household 
members decreased during the Great Recession. As households faced challenges that led them 
to reduce giving and/or to give less (in terms of amount) to charitable organizations, they also 
appeared to reduce their participation in private transfers to non-household family members 
and friends who had difficulty meeting basic needs during the Great Recession. However, the 
changes in predicted private transfer participation rates were smaller compared to observed 
changes in charitable giving. As such, having close ties with non-household family members 
who can provide additional assistance appears to be important during periods of economic 
downturn. Future research should focus on improving understanding of how private transfers 
and social networks respond during periods of economic recession to explain how such 
negative economic conditions impact informal giving behaviors. 
Similar to giving, American volunteering rates have also declined over the past twenty 
years. While the PPS only measured volunteering incidence in 2003, 2005, and 2011, we are 
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able to explore more years of volunteering behaviors using the Current Population Survey’s 
(CPS) volunteering supplement (see Table A1.7). The CPS, sponsored jointly by the U.S. Census 
Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), is the primary source of labor force 
statistics for the population of the United States. Data is collected monthly from a survey of 
about 60,000 U.S. households. From 2002 to 2015, the volunteering rate declined at a slow and 
steady rate from around 30 percent (in 2002-2005) to 26 percent (in 2015), the most recent 
year for which we have data.  
From the CPS, we see a similar trend over time with volunteering rates declining 
between the pre- and post- recession eras, although these rates of decline are smaller than 
those observed for charitable giving rates. Taken together, the results on volunteering do not 
appear to follow a simple pre- and post- recession story. In fact, during the recession, the rate 
held steady at 28 percent, only dropping to 26-27 percent four years after the end of the 
recession. The main insight from this analysis is that we do not find any increases in 
volunteering to offset the observed declines in giving. 
 
Robustness Checks 
One of the largest impacts of the recession on families and individuals was through the 
loss of employment. To examine whether the loss of a job during the recession is associated 
with giving behavior, we compared trends in giving for those who lost their jobs during the 
recession (defined as employed prior to the recession and unemployed in and after recession 
years) with those who did not lose their job during this time period. We restrict the comparison 
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to those younger than 60 years of age. Both summary statistics and regression analysis suggest 
that loss of one’s job did not have an additional negative and significant impact on giving. 
It is also notable that the U.S. experienced a shorter and milder recession in 2001, prior 
to the Great Recession. Although the PPS is conducted bi-annually and did not cover the exact 
year in which we would expect charitable giving to be the most affected by this recession, 
including either data from the year 2000 or 2002 as non-recession years may still impact the 
estimation. Therefore, as a final robustness check, we conducted two sets of additional 
empirical analyses that exclude data the 2001 and 2003 waves of the PPS, respectively. The 
results are very similar to our main results, suggesting that the 2001 recession is unlikely to 
have had a large influence on the overall decline in giving that we have observed between the 
pre- and post- recession eras. 
 
Conclusion 
The Great Recession exposed the philanthropic sector’s vulnerability to economic 
shocks. Economic and fiscal uncertainty, coupled with external societal forces, promises to 
shape future levels and amounts of giving to charitable organizations in the United States. 
Understanding how to adapt to an ever-changing environment will mean developing new 
models of relationship-building that sustain interest in philanthropy over time, despite periods 
of economic downturn. An important area of exploration for future research involves better 
understanding the long-term impact of the Great Recession as well as how each generation’s 
unique experiences and resulting values and beliefs arising from the Great Recession have 
distinctly shaped their giving behaviors and habits (Rooney et al., 2018).  
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Young Americans have come of age during the Great Recession, an era of greater 
technological innovation and integration into daily living, and a period shaped by declining 
levels of trust in formal institutions. These factors will likely shape their charitable giving now – 
and in the future. As Millennials gain economic and financial stability, the question of whether 
their charitable giving rates and amounts will increase, as their income levels and wealth 
increase, is yet to be answered. Future research should focus on disentangling the role of 
recession-driven change compared to generational change in shaping their giving behaviors.  
 31 













Before recession After recession











Before recession After recession












Before recession After recession
Giving rates by gender and marital status










Before recession After recession
Giving amounts by gender and marital 
status










Before recession After recession











Before recession After recession











Before recession After recession
Giving rates by education level








Before recession After recession
Giving amounts by education level
High school or less More than high school
 32 













Before recession After recession











Before recession After recession













Before recession After recession
Secular Giving Rates by Gender and Marital 
Status











Before recession After recession
Secular Giving Amounts by Gender and Marital 
Status










Before recession After recession











Before recession After recession












Before recession After recession
Secular Giving Rates by Education











Before recession After recession
Secular Giving Amounts by Education
High school or less More than high school
 33 













Before recession After recession












Before recession After recession












Before recession After recession
Religious Giving Rates by Gender and Marital 
Status









Before recession After recession
Religious Giving Amounts by Gender and Marital 
Status










Before recession After recession













Before recession After recession












Before recession After recession
Religious Giving Rates by Education










Before recession After recession
Religious Giving Amounts by Education
High school or less More than high school
 34 
Appendix 1: Supplemental Tables 
Table A1.1: Theories, Benefit, and Recession Expectations 
Theory Benefit Expectation during Recession 
Altruism Improving the well-being of 
others 
+ or - 
Social Making friends or family happy - 
Avoidance of group censure + or - 
Reputation/Norms Enhanced donor reputation + 
Guilt Reduce negative feelings + or - 
Self-Esteem  “Warm glow” satisfaction in 
the act of donating 
+ 
Note: This table has been adapted from Konrath & Handy (2018) to include Recession-based 
predictions. 
 
Table A1.2: Summary Statistics 
 Before Recession After recession Overall 
 Mean sd Mean sd Mean sd 
Panel 1. Giving 
incidences and 
amounts       
Overall Giving rates 66.48% 0.47 60.03% 0.49 63.04% 0.48 
Secular giving rates 55.96% 0.5 51.06% 0.5 53.34% 0.5 
Religious giving rates 45.33% 0.5 37.44% 0.48 41.12% 0.49 
Average giving amounts 
$1,691.0
7  4281 $1,525 4238 
$1,602.4
2  4259 
Average giving amounts 
to secular $651.91  2264 $648 2606 $650.01  2453 
Average giving amounts 
to religious 
$1,039.1
6  3120 $877 2803 $952.41  3120 
 
Panel 2. Socio-
demographic variables       
Age 48.64 17.02 50.36 17.38 49.56 17.24 
Single Men 17.28% 0.38 19.35% 0.4 18.38% 0.39 
Single Women 29.14% 0.45 30.74% 0.46 30.00% 0.46 
Legally Married 50.00% 0.5 45.77% 0.5 47.74% 0.5 
White 76.38% 0.42 73.44% 0.44 74.81% 0.43 
African American 13.36% 0.34 15.38% 0.36 14.44% 0.35 
Hispanic 6.71% 0.25 8.68% 0.28 7.76% 0.27 
Less than High school 15.85% 0.37 12.67% 0.33 14.16% 0.35 
High school 31.21% 0.46 28.11% 0.45 29.56% 0.46 
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Some college 22.54% 0.42 25.13% 0.43 23.92% 0.43 
College 15.07% 0.36 18.32% 0.39 16.81% 0.37 
Graduate 9.96% 0.3 14.78% 0.35 12.53% 0.33 
Education missing 5.37% 0.23 0.98% 0.1 3.03% 0.17 
Number of children 60.39% 1.02 52.68% 1 56.28% 1.01 
Catholic 23.70% 0.43 23.23% 0.42 23.45% 0.42 
All Protestant 56.20% 0.5 53.83% 0.5 54.93% 0.5 
Jewish 3.25% 0.18 3.12% 0.17 3.18% 0.18 
Self-reported health is 
good 83.36% 0.37 81.76% 0.39 82.51% 0.38 
Currently employed 66.65% 0.47 62.42% 0.48 64.39% 0.48 
Currently disabled 3.43% 0.18 4.26% 0.2 3.87% 0.19 
Currently retired 16.74% 0.37 19.63% 0.4 18.28% 0.39 
Northeast 18.58% 0.39 17.81% 0.38 18.17% 0.39 
Northcentral 27.13% 0.44 26.36% 0.44 26.72% 0.44 
South 32.78% 0.47 33.82% 0.47 33.33% 0.47 
West (including HI and 
AK) 21.02% 0.41 21.41% 0.41 21.23% 0.41 
Real family permanent 
income $84,053 130129 $77,957 114513 $80,799 122078 









Table A1.3: Charitable Giving – Baseline regression results – Full regression table 
  Incidence   Average 
Amounts 
 
 Overall Secular Religious Overall Secular Religious 
       





-0.051*** -0.079*** -185.856*** -23.800 -162.057*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (32.246) (21.852) (22.662) 




      
Single Men 0.016 0.001 0.048*** 204.113*** 124.794*** 79.319 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (78.787) (44.651) (53.249) 
       
Single 
Women 
0.100*** 0.108*** 0.113*** 166.128*** 128.324*** 37.804 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (60.655) (35.084) (40.916) 
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Married 0.148*** 0.110*** 0.208*** 1014.233*** 228.933*** 785.299*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (58.426) (27.856) (42.890) 
       
Black  -
0.048*** 
-0.061*** 0.013 134.187** 92.285*** 41.901 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (65.738) (32.092) (49.296) 
       
Hispanic  -
0.060*** 
-0.095*** -0.020 -218.870** -203.526*** -15.344 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (103.119) (46.453) (78.710) 
       
Age 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 27.376*** 10.362*** 17.014*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (2.018) (1.206) (1.348) 
       
Education: 
base is less 
than high 
school 
      
High school 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.077*** 125.739** -28.153 153.892*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (55.995) (26.247) (42.972) 
       
Some 
college 
0.181*** 0.177*** 0.137*** 516.540*** 101.828*** 414.712*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (68.614) (32.878) (52.270) 
       
College 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.179*** 1196.969*** 516.530*** 680.438*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (103.576) (55.445) (74.498) 
       
Graduate 0.269*** 0.284*** 0.178*** 1682.010*** 753.259*** 928.751*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (145.936) (79.108) (97.558) 
       
Catholic 0.052*** 0.033*** 0.188*** -66.044 -95.989 29.946 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (91.177) (59.660) (55.820) 
       
Protestant 0.068*** 0.017** 0.198*** 646.665*** -110.851** 757.516*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (72.944) (49.679) (45.903) 
       
Jewish 0.055** 0.070*** 0.068*** 1264.376** 1036.974*** 227.402 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (524.951) (282.403) (297.556) 
       
Good health 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 286.648*** 104.026*** 182.622*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (52.728) (27.242) (38.109) 
       
Number of 0.001 -0.005** 0.025*** 25.764 3.384 22.380 
 37 
children 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (29.531) (12.782) (22.200) 
       
currently 
disabled 
-0.036** -0.030* -0.052*** -334.587*** -32.891 -301.695*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (89.356) (42.769) (63.876) 
       
currently 
retired 
0.001 -0.001 0.008 -576.879*** -266.440*** -310.439*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (123.140) (60.171) (87.015) 





0.076*** 0.093*** 0.039*** 398.012*** 240.263*** 157.749*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (35.544) (23.090) (17.265) 




0.015*** 0.016*** 0.010*** 116.876*** 61.178*** 55.697*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (8.119) (4.429) (5.458) 
       
Constant -
4.952*** 
-5.103*** -4.528*** -7247.384*** -3525.040*** -3722.345*** 
 (0.228) (0.238) (0.204) (432.254) (281.568) (216.760) 
Observations 100501 100501 100501 100501 100501 100501 
R2    0.141 0.095 0.108 
Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at individual level; State controls not 
reported. Marginal effects reported in column 1-3. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A1.4: Summary of all regression based predicted values 
    Incidence Average amounts 
    Overall Secular Religious Overall Secular 
Religiou
s 
Panel A        
All 
Americans 
Before the Great 





 After the Great 
Recession 0.602 0.511 0.375 
1518.09
5 640.333 877.763 
 % change 9.61% 9.07% 17.40% 10.91% 3.58% 15.59% 
                
Panel B        
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Americans 
aged 35 or 
less 
Before the Great 
Recession 0.588 0.5 0.344 1192.43 501.82 690.61 
 After the Great 
Recession 0.522 0.435 0.296 1124.39 410.64 713.75 
 % change 11.22% 13.00% 13.95% 5.71% 18.17% -3.35% 
         
American 
more than 35 
years old 
Before the Great 
Recession 0.691 0.58 0.481 1850.7 709.9 1140.8 
 After the Great 
Recession 0.635 0.54 0.403 1671.8 724.45 947.35 
 % change 8.10% 6.90% 16.22% 9.67% -2.05% 16.96% 
                
Panel C        
Cohabited Before the Great Recession 
0.566 0.487 0.296 1108.31 516.70 591.62 
 After the Great Recession 
0.487 0.414 0.241 964.54 452.27 512.27 
 % change 13.96% 14.99% 18.58% 12.97% 12.47% 13.41% 
        
Single Men Before the Great Recession 0.589 0.485 0.357 1314.98 610.53 704.45 
 After the Great 
Recession 0.501 0.418 0.272 1167.98 600.12 567.85 
 % change 14.94% 13.81% 23.81% 11.18% 1.71% 19.39% 
         
Single 
Women 
Before the Great 
Recession 0.659 0.576 0.413 1268.68 626.9 641.78 
 After the Great 
Recession 0.608 0.542 0.343 1137.47 593.49 543.98 
 % change 7.74% 5.90% 16.95% 10.34% 5.33% 15.24% 
         
Married 
couples 
Before the Great 
Recession 0.715 0.589 0.522 2172.75 720.19 1452.56 
 After the Great 
Recession 0.65 0.534 0.434 1934.76 700.39 1234.37 
 % change 9.09% 9.34% 16.86% 10.95% 2.75% 15.02% 
                
Panel D        
Non-white Before the Great Recession 0.631 0.5 0.471 1670.02 609.06 1060.95 
 After the Great 
Recession 0.56 0.448 0.389 1475.71 580.69 895.02 
 39 
 % change 11.25% 10.40% 17.41% 11.64% 4.66% 15.64% 
         
White Before the Great Recession 0.68 0.583 0.449 1716.04 683.33 1032.71 
 After the Great 
Recession 0.617 0.531 0.371 1531.87 659.76 872.11 
 % change 9.26% 8.92% 17.37% 10.73% 3.45% 15.55% 
                
Panel E        
High School 
or less 
Before the Great 
Recession 0.588 0.477 0.396 1152.7 419.73 732.97 
 After the Great 
Recession 0.521 0.43 0.325 1143.71 478.86 664.85 
 % change 11.39% 9.85% 17.93% 0.78% -14.09% 9.29% 
         
More than 
high school 
Before the Great 
Recession 0.728 0.627 0.498 2140.9 855.01 1285.88 
 After the Great 
Recession 0.678 0.583 0.423 1890.54 799.56 1090.98 
  % change 6.87% 7.02% 15.06% 11.69% 6.49% 15.16% 
Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at individual level; other controls includes 
employment, income, wealth, religious preference, health status and state effects. Data from 
2001-2015 PPS. All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2016 U.S. dollars.  
 
Table A1.5: Summary of coefficients of regressions in table A1.4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probit Coefficients OLS coefficients 
 Overall Secular  Religious Overall Secular  Religious 








 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (32.246) (21.852) (22.662) 




-0.20*** -0.13*** -0.23*** -178.90*** 14.56 -193.45*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (38.471) (26.900) (26.862) 
       
Age <= 35 -0.35*** -0.25*** -0.41*** -658.27*** -208.08*** -450.19*** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (49.090) (30.773) (34.629) 
       
Age <= 35 * 
recession 
-0.02 -0.08** 0.08** 110.86** -105.74*** 216.59*** 
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 (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (54.982) (37.474) (36.368) 
       
Panel 3. Gender and Marital status; Reference group is cohabited. 
       
After 
Recession 
-0.25*** -0.23*** -0.19*** -143.77*** -64.42** -79.35** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.051) (47.417) (28.557) (31.559) 
       
Married 0.51*** 0.32*** 0.68*** 1064.44*** 203.50*** 860.94*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.048) (65.696) (32.145) (48.523) 
       
Single women 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.36*** 160.36** 110.20*** 50.16 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.055) (70.821) (40.893) (47.730) 
       
Single Men 0.07 -0.01 0.20*** 206.66** 93.83* 112.83 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.060) (98.983) (49.651) (75.991) 
       
Married * 
recession 
0.02 0.06 -0.07 -94.22 44.62 -138.84*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.052) (63.475) (41.825) (43.858) 
       
Single women 
* recession 
0.08 0.12** -0.02 12.57 31.01 -18.44 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.058) (67.121) (43.735) (43.005) 
       
Single men * 
recession 
-0.03 0.02 -0.09 -3.23 54.02 -57.24 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.064) (86.605) (59.848) (61.780) 
       




-0.24*** -0.16*** -0.26*** -194.30*** -28.37 -165.93*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (40.585) (22.950) (28.740) 
       
White 0.17*** 0.27*** -0.07** 46.02 74.27** -28.25 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (65.096) (33.956) (48.562) 
       
White * 
recession 
0.02 -0.01 0.01 10.13 4.80 5.33 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (52.141) (32.955) (36.674) 
Panel 5. Education. Reference group is high school or less 
 
Recession -0.21*** -0.14*** -0.22*** -8.99 59.13** -68.12*** 
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 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (34.649) (26.066) (24.382) 
       
More than 
high school 
0.48*** 0.46*** 0.31*** 988.20*** 435.29*** 552.91*** 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (71.674) (36.266) (53.221) 
       
More than 
high school * 
recession 
0.03 0.00 -0.00 -241.37*** -114.59*** -126.78*** 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (62.349) (41.494) (45.750) 
Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at individual level; other controls includes 
employment,, income, wealth, religious preference, health status and state effects. Data from 
2001-2015 PPS. All dollar amounts are adjusted to 2016 U.S. dollars. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 
< 0.01 
 
Table A1.6: Regression based predicted values of Informal Giving/Private Transfers 
    






  (0.003) (37.317) 




  (0.003) (34.267) 
    
Americans 





  (0.005) (37.398) 




  (0.004) (38.749) 








  (0.004) (47.576) 




  (0.004) (46.881) 
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Single Men Before 
recession 
0.227 1648.363 
  (0.011) (153.994) 




  (0.011) (162.025) 






  (0.006) (46.142) 




  (0.006) (54.076) 






  (0.004) (43.531) 




  (0.003) (33.518) 




  (0.007) (64.906) 




  (0.007) (56.792) 




  (0.003) (44.257) 




  (0.003) (40.536) 






  (0.005) (46.461) 
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  (0.008) (47.693) 






  (0.008) (132.619) 




  (0.006) (95.840) 
    
 
Table A1.7: Volunteering Rates from Current Population Survey (CPS) data 
Year Volunteering rates Standard deviations 
2002 29.43% 0.456 
2003 30.50% 0.460 
2004 30.76% 0.461 
2005 30.78% 0.462 
2006 28.73% 0.453 
2007 28.32% 0.451 
2008 28.40% 0.451 
2009 28.75% 0.453 
2010 27.96% 0.449 
2011 28.41% 0.451 
2012 28.13% 0.450 
2013 27.03% 0.444 
2014 26.78% 0.443 
2015 26.04% 0.439 





Appendix 2: Supplemental Figures 
Figure A2.1: U.S. Household Giving Rates 2000-2014
 
Figure A2.2: U.S. Donor Household Average Giving Amounts 2000-2004 
66.22% 67.63% 66.87% 65.26% 65.41%
61.11% 58.80%
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Figure A2.3: Predicted Giving Rates by Generation 
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